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Notes
Morgan v. Illinois: The Supreme Court Supports
the Right of a Capital Defendant to an
Impartial Sentencing Jury
Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there
comes a man from the country and prays for admittance to the
Law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance
at the moment ....
The doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets
him sit down at one side of the door....
The doorkeeper fre-

quently has little interviews with him, asking him questions
about his home and many other things, but the questions are put
indifferently, as great lords put them, and always finish with the
statement that he cannot be let in yet.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 15, 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided
Morgan v. Illinois.2 In a six-to-three decision, the Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment3 grants
capital defendants the right to question prospective sentencing jurors on their propensity to vote in favor of capital punishment.'
The Court also ruled that capital sentencing jurors who intend to
vote automatically for a death sentence upon conviction of a defendant cannot be impartial, as due process requires. 5
Despite a forceful dissent and heretofore limited recognition of
rights to specific voir dire inquiries,6 the Morgan Court reached a
conclusion dictated by fundamental fairness: capital defendants
must have effective means of detecting and excluding the most seriously partial of prospective capital sentencing jurors-those who
would impose the death penalty on any person convicted of a capi1. FRANZ KAFKA, Before
LAWYERS AND THE LAW 285

the Law, in LEGAL FICTIONS: SHORT STORIES ABOUT
(Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Jay Wishingrad ed., 1992).

2. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
3. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......
U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2233.
5. Id. at 2229-30, 2233-35.
6. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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tal crime. In doing so, the Court expanded the due process rights
of capital defendants.
This Note first reviews the constitutional aspects of capital sentencing, the elements of the voir dire process, and the trial court's
power to shape voir dire.7 The Note also traces the Court's prior
rulings on challenges for cause based on the death-penalty beliefs
of prospective capital sentencing jurors, and examines the Illinois
death penalty statute.' The Note then summarizes the facts of
Morgan and analyzes its majority and dissenting opinions. 9 Next,
the impact of the Morgan ruling is explored. Finally, this Note
concludes that Morgan is a sound affirmation of the capital defendant's due process rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Constitution and Capital Sentencing

The Constitution does not require capital sentencing to be conducted by jury." The Supreme Court has held that if a jury is
used, however, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that it meet the impartiality standard of the Sixth
Amendment.12 Further, the Court has also held that for all but the
rarest of cases, the Eighth Amendment 3 prohibits mandatory capital sentencing and guarantees capital defendants the right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencing judge or jury. 4
7. See infra parts II.A and B.
8. See infra parts II.C and D.
9. See infra part III.
10. See infra parts IV and V.
11. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984));
see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW, § 2.14(), at 250 & n.94 (1986) (noting that the death penalty is not constitutionally
required to be imposed by a jury).
12. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
criminal defendants an impartial guilt-determining jury but does not apply directly to
capital sentencing juries. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. However, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause independently requires that a capital sentencing jury meet an
impartiality standard equivalent to that of the Sixth Amendment. Id. (citing Turner v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965)).
13. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
14. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 600-01, 604 (1978). In Lockett, the Court stated:
[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but
the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the cir-
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B.

499

Voir Dire

During voir dire, the trial judge, counsel, or both15 question prospective jurors on their personal beliefs and knowledge. I6 Counsel
may then attempt to exclude from the jury persons who have expressed views unfavorable to their case. 17 This is accomplished
through discretionary but numerically limited peremptory chal8
lenges or through judge-approved challenges for cause.'
Venirepersons19 may be excluded for cause if they possess a bias
that would prevent them from serving impartially as jurors. Statutes and court decisions commonly specify the grounds that justify
exclusion for cause.2 ° In a given case, the trial judge ultimately
decides if a challenged person's responses form a proper basis for
exclusion, 21 and an unlimited number of prospective jurors may be
excluded for cause.22 The trial court's ruling on a challenge for
cause may ordinarily be reversed only for manifest error.23
The trial court typically enjoys broad discretion in controlling
the questions posed to prospective jurors in voir dire.24 State courts
are required to grant defendants' requests for specific inquiries only
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death.
Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
15. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 21.3(a),
at 722 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter LAFAVE, GRIM. PROC.].
16. Id. § 21.3(a), at 718.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. A venire is "[tihe group of citizens from [which] a jury is chosen in a given case."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
20. LaFave and Israel provide the following example, taken from the ALI Code of
Criminal Procedure and used as a model by many states: "That the juror has a state of
mind in reference to the cause or to the defendant or to the person alleged to have been
injured by the offense charged, or to the person on whose complaint the prosecution was
instituted, which will prevent him from acting with impartiality ...." LAFAVE, CRIM.
PROC., supra note 15, § 21.3(c), at 728-29.
The Illinois criminal voir dire statute identifies no grounds for challenge for cause. It
states only: "Each party may challenge jurors for cause." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
115-4(d) (1991). The identical language appears in the Illinois Supreme Court Rule on
criminal voir dire. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 434(a) (1991).
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined proper grounds for challenge for cause as "narrowly specified, provable, and legally cognizable bases of partiality." Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
21. LAFAVE, CRIM. PROC., supra note 15, § 21.3(a), at 718; Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 423 (1985) (stating that "[i]t
is then the trial judge's duty to determine whether
the challenge is proper").
22. LAFAVE, CRIM. PROC., supra note 15, § 21.3(c), at 728.
23. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1907 (1991) (citing Patton v. Yount, 467
U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984)).
24. LAFAVE, CRIM. PROC., supra note 15, § 21.3(a), at 719.
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25
if due process demands it.
The Court has stated that refusing a
requested inquiry violates due process when it renders a trial "fundamentally unfair."' 26 Before Morgan, the Court recognized due
process rights only to questions regarding racial or ethnic prejudice, and then only in cases in which it was substantially probable
that such prejudice might influence the jury.27 Emphasizing the
singularly grievous consequence of an erroneously imposed capital
sentence, the Court has ruled that in cases involving interracial
capital crimes defendants must be allowed to probe prospective jurors for racial bias.28 In instances in which it has recognized rights
to defendant-requested voir dire inquiries, the Court has also qualified that recognition: the trial judge must cover the subject of the
request, but the judge retains control over the exact content and
number of questions asked.29

25. Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct at 1903-04. The Court's supervisory powers allow it to hold
federal courts to a higher standard. Id. For a discussion of the Court's use of its supervisory powers, see LAFAVE, CRIM. PROC., supra note 15, § 21.3(a), at 719.
26. Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct. at 1905.
27. LAFAVE, CRIM. PRoc., supra note 15, § 21.3(a), at 719-23. The Court's decisions in this area, however, are not entirely consistent. Id.
In Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525, 527 (1973), the Court held that an
African-American civil rights worker who alleged that he had been "framed" for marijuana possession in retaliation for his activities was entitled by due process to ask specific
questions with regard to racial bias. However, shortly afterward, the Court ruled against
a defendant whose claim of entitlement to a racial bias inquiry centered on the fact that
he, an African-American, was accused of violently assaulting a white victim. Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 590, 597-98 (1976). The Ristaino Court suggested that allowing an
inquiry on racial bias is required by due process only in cases in which racial issues are
"inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial." 424 U.S. at 597; see also RosalesLopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1981) (endorsing this principle and the
result reached in Ristaino). The Court found that these circumstances were not present
in Ristaino. 424 U.S. at 597.
The Ristaino Court noted, however, that if Ristaino had been a federal case, the Court
would have used its supervisory powers to allow the defendant the inquiry he requested.
Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 598 n.9. In Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 192, the Court further detailed this position by construing Ristaino and Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308
(1931), to conclude that "federal trial courts must make such an inquiry when requested
by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and the victim are
members of different racial or ethnic groups."
In the recent Mu'Min decision, the Court held five-to-four that due process was not
violated when a trial judge, who had questioned venirepersons on the subject of pretrial
publicity in a capital case, refused the defendant's request for specified questions on the
exact content of the publicity to which the venirepersons had been exposed. 111 S.Ct. at
1908. The Court determined that due process did not require a judge to pose the exact
questions requested. Id.
28. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-37 (1986).
29. "[T]he trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on
the subject ...." Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37 (citing Ham, 409 U.S. at 527).

Morgan v. Illinois
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C.

Challengesfor Cause Based on Death Sentence Bias

The Morgan decision extends a line of Court decisions that have
ruled on the state's power to exclude prospective capital sentencing
jurors who oppose the death penalty.30 In those cases, the Court
confronted the polarized self-interests that are at work in capital
case voir dire.a" Prosecutors seeking the death penalty naturally
try to keep persons opposed to or uncertain about capital punishment off the jury and try instead to load the jury with death penalty advocates. Capital defendants, of course, want a sentencing
jury stacked with death penalty opponents. Moreover, defendants
and prosecutors must strive to select favorable jurors from a pool
of individuals with varying beliefs about capital punishment.3 2
Against this backdrop, in the pre-Morgan decisions the Court
attempted to identify the anti-death-penalty bias that would make
a prospective sentencing juror partial and therefore subject to exclusion for cause. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,33 for example, the
prosecutor relied on an Illinois statute that allowed the State to
exclude for cause venirepersons who expressed scruples against imposing capital punishment. 34 The prosecutor thereby excluded
forty-seven venirepersons, nearly one-half of the prospective jurors,
on the basis of their death penalty views.35 Only five of those who
were excluded had expressed an absolute unwillingness to vote for
a death sentence; 36 the remainder had voiced a more general opposition to the death penalty, based on principle. 37 The jury thus selected convicted the defendant and imposed a death sentence. 38
On review, the Court found that the grounds for challenge used
30.
31.
32.
capital

See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
See id.
According to a June 1991 Gallup Poll, 76% of the national population favored
punishment as an option in murder cases. Alec Gallup & Dr. Frank Newport,

Death Penalty Support Remains Strong, THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 1991, at 40.

In contrast, a 1966 poll showed that 42% of the population favored and 49% opposed the
death penalty option. Id. Half of those supporting the death penalty in the 1991 poll
based their position on their belief in the concept of "an eye for an eye." Id. at 41-42.
However, if given a choice between prescribing either the death penalty or a life term
without parole for murderers, 53% of those surveyed in 1991 would choose the former
and 35% the latter. Id. at 44.
33. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
34. Id. at 512-13. The Illinois statute at issue in Witherspoon stated: "In trials for
murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state
that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the
same." Id. at 512 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 743 (1959)).
35. Id. at 514.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 514-15, 520.
38. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512.
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by the Illinois prosecutor had produced a jury "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."' 39 The Court held that a capital
sentencing jury is not impartial, as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, if the state systematically 4° excludes prospective jurors who express no more than general objections to the
death penalty. 41 The Court added, however, that it would not prohibit the state from excluding for cause venirepersons who indicated with unmistakable clarity that they would never impose a
capital sentence.42
The Court has since revisited Witherspoon in further defining the
proper grounds for excluding venirepersons who oppose capital
punishment.43 In Wainwright v. Witt, 44 the Court addressed the
then widely held view that Witherspoon limited exclusions for
cause to only those venirepersons who clearly announced that they
would never vote for a death sentence.4 5 The Wainwright Court
39. Id. at 521.
40. See id. at 519:
A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make
the discretionary judgement entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the
oath he takes as a juror. But a jury from which all such men have been excluded cannot perform the task demanded of it.
(emphasis added); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985) ("In Witherspoon, this
Court held that the State infringes a capital defendant's right . . .when it excuses for
cause all those members of the venire who express conscientious objections to capital
punishment.") (emphasis added).
41. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522.
42. Id. at 522 n.21. Footnote 21, which has engendered considerable controversy,
states:
We repeat, however, that nothing we say today bears upon the power of a State
to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably
clear .. .that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial
of the case before them ....
Id.
43. See, e.g., Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (addressing the correct interpretation of Witherspoon).
44. 469 U.S. 412 (1985). The Court's latest reassessment of the Witherspoon footnote, prior to Morgan, occurred in Wainwright.
45. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 417-19. The Court noted that "[d]espite Witherspoon's
limited holding, later opinions in this Court and the lower courts have referred to the
language in footnote 21, or similar language in Witherspoon's footnote 9, as setting the
standard for judging the proper exclusion of a juror opposed to capital punishment." Id.
at 418 (citing Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 265 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S.
478, 482 (1969); Hackathorn v. Decker, 438 F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 1971); People v.
Washington, 458 P.2d 479, 496-97 (Cal. 1969)). This interpretation of Witherspoon was
widespread. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES
§ 23.03[2] (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter JURYWORK] (noting that prior to Wainwright, the
only venirepersons who could be excluded for cause were those who stated affirmatively

1993]

Morgan v. Illinois

saw this interpretation as part of a "general confusion" over
"dicta." 46 The Court dismissed the test of impartiality that resulted as too exacting to be practical.47 The Court stressed that
generally, an impartial juror is one who will "conscientiously apply
the law and find the facts."' 4 It then held that the state may exclude for cause prospective capital sentencing jurors whose views
on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the
performance" of their duties.49
that they would never vote for a death sentence); Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in
CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 153

(Kenneth C. Haas & James Inciardi eds., 1988) [hereinafter CHALLENGING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT] (indicating that Wainwright necessitated a shift away from the long-term
and wide application of the Witherspoon footnote as a limiting standard).
46. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 417-19, 422. The Wainwright Court labeled the footnote
dicta because Witherspoon's "holding focused only on circumstances under which prospective jurors could not be excluded; under Witherspoon's facts it was unnecessary to
decide when they could be." Id. at 422.
47. Id. at 424-25. "What common sense should have realized experience has proved:
many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their
bias has been made 'unmistakably clear'...." Id.
48. Id. at 423.
49. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S.
38, 45 (1980)). The Court introduced the phrase prevent or substantiallyimpair the performance of his duties as a juror as an exclusion standard in Adams, which, even before
Wainwright, rejected the Witherspoon footnote as a limit on state challenges for cause.
Adams, 448 U.S. at 47-48 (stating that "it is clear beyond peradventure that Witherspoon
is not a ground for challenging of any prospective juror").
To further justify its standard, the Wainwright Court added: "[W]e do not believe that
[the Witherspoon footnote] language can be squared with the duties of present-day capital
sentencing juries." Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 421. The Court noted that when Witherspoon was decided, capital sentencing jurors were largely left to their own discretion in
determining a sentence. Id. at 421-22. According to the Court, a juror at that time
needed only to be willing to consider the death penalty in order to follow the sparse
instructions which were then prevalent. Id. In other words, those instructions had allowed capital sentencing jurors to be guided sheerly by their conscience when choosing
between death and imprisonment. The Court reasoned that prospective jurors of that
time were thus partial only if their beliefs against capital punishment were so strong that
they were in fact incapable of any real choice. Id.
The Court continued by observing that since Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), capital sentencing juries have been constrained by more detailed instructions, which guide them through one or more factual
determinations as a prerequisite to imposing a death sentence. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at
422. As such, the Court concluded, a currently correct measure of impartiality should
focus on a prospective juror's ability to follow instructions, regardless of personal beliefs.
Id.
The Court has since opined:
It is important to remember that not all who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death
penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they
state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in
deference to the rule of law.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986). Observers have commented that under
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While Witherspoon and Wainwright addressed the state's power
to exclude venirepersons who oppose the death penalty, those cases
did not rule on the defendant's right to exclude those who favor it.
However, the Court did comment on this issue in Ross v.
Oklahoma.50 In Ross, the trial court had denied a capital defendant's challenge for cause of a venireperson who stated that he
would automatically vote for a death sentence upon conviction of
the defendant. 5' The defendant removed the venireperson with a
peremptory challenge instead.52 On review, the Court held that
the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause did not deprive
the defendant of an impartial jury, since the challenged person had
never sat on the jury.53 The Court stated in dicta, however, that
had the challenged person been seated, it would have been necessary to overturn the sentence.54
D.

The Illinois Death Penalty Statute

In Illinois, a defendant convicted of capital murder by a jury
may have his sentence determined either by that same jury or by a
judge.55 Capital sentencing by jury consists of two stages, an eligibility stage and a weighing stage.56 In the eligibility stage, the jury
determines whether any aggravating factors are present; if there
are none, the defendant is automatically sentenced to a term of
57
imprisonment.

Wainwright, prosecutors can exclude more venirepersons on the basis of their opposition
to the death penalty than was possible under the interpretation of the Witherspoon footnote that Wainwright discounted. See JURYWORK, supra note 45, § 23.03[l][a] (stating
that Wainwright "broadened the standards" of exclusion and "will increase the number
of people who can be excluded for cause as a result of their beliefs in opposition to the
death penalty"); LAFAVE, CRIM. PROC., supra note 15, § 21.3, at 248 (Supp. 1991) (characterizing the Court's decision in Wainwright as adopting a "less demanding standard").
50. 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
51. Id. at 83-84.
52. Id. at 84.
53. Id. at 85-88.
54. Id. at 85.
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(d) (1991).
56. The Morgan Court employed this useful characterization of the operation of the
statute. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2225-26. The statute is found at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 9-1(b)-(g) (1991). A sentencing judge follows essentially the same process. Id. at
para. 9-1(h).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)-(h) (1991). "Aggravating factors may include but need not be limited to," murder of a peace officer, firefighter, or corrections
officer; multiple murders; murder committed during a hijacking; murder for hire; certain
felony murders; exceptionally brutal murder of a victim under 12 years of age; murder of
a witness or other person assisting in a criminal prosecution; murder committed in connection with an offense under the Controlled Substances Act; certain murders committed
in a correctional institution; "cold, calculated and premeditated" murder. Id. at para. 9-
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If the jury unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
one or more aggravating factors exist, the defendant is eligible for a
death sentence.58 The jury then proceeds to the weighing stage, in
which it weighs mitigating 9 and aggravating factors against each
other.' If the jury unanimously finds that the mitigating factors
are not sufficient to preclude a death sentence, the court sentences
the defendant to death.61
III.

A.

DISCUSSION

The Facts of Morgan v. Illinois

Petitioner Derrick Morgan was charged with the contract murder of a drug dealer. 62 The Illinois prosecutor pursued a capital
sentence.6 a As required by Illinois law, the trial court conducted
voir dire.64
l(b)-(c). The prosecution must prove the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at para. 9-1(f).
58. Id.
59. "Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to," defendant has no
significant prior criminal record; defendant under extreme emotional stress at the time of
the murder; victim was a participant in the homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act; defendant acted under threat of death or great bodily harm; defendant was not
personally present during the commission of the murder. Id. at para. 9-1(c). No burden
of proof is specified for mitigating factors.
60. Id. at para. 9-1(b)-(h). The statute directs that "[t]he court.., shall instruct the
jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the
imposition of the death penalty." Id. at para. 9-1(c); see also People v. Simms, 572 N.E.
2d 947, 959 (Ill. 1991) (stating that "[tihe State bears the burden of going forward with
factors in aggravation and the defendant has the burden of going forward with evidence
of mitigating factors. The sentencing determination is a weighing process in which
neither party bears the burden of proof.") (citations omitted).
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, para. 9-1(g). A sentencing judge follows essentially the
same procedure. Id. at para. 9-1(h). In September 1992, U.S. District Court Judge Marvin Aspen vacated an Illinois death sentence on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, declaring: "The Illinois statute, as implemented through the [Illinois pattern
jury instructions and the instructions given in the case decided], permits the arbitrary and
unguided imposition of the death sentence." United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 806 F.
Supp. 705, 731-32 (N.D. Ill. 1992), vacated, Free v. Peters, No. 89 C 3765 (N.D. Ill. April
15, 1993). The court relied largely on two studies that showed conflicting and erroneous
understanding of the instructions among survey respondents. Id. at 728-31 (citations
omitted). The State is appealing. NAT'L L.J., October 12, 1992, at 6. Judge Aspen
vacated Free because the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Gacy v. Welborn,
Nos. 92-3448 and 92-3965, WL 007075 (7th Cir. April 12, 1993) amounted to a de facto
reversal of Free. Free v. Peters, No. 89 C 3765 (N.D. 111. April 15, 1993).
62. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2226.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1184-85 (1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1037 (1985)). The controlling Illinois Supreme Court rule states:
The court shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors by putting to them questions it thinks appropriate touching their qualifications to
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Prior to voir dire, the trial court explained capital trial procedure
in general terms to each of the three venires called.65 In addition,
pursuant to the prosecutor's request and over defense counsel's objection, the court asked each venire en masse whether anyone had
beliefs that would prohibit him or her from voting for the death
penalty if Morgan were convicted.66 As a result of their affirmative
answers, seventeen venirepersons were excused.67 Also, each of the
jurors eventually empaneled was asked individually a similar question; all said that they would not automatically vote against a
death sentence.68
After seven members of the first venire, including three who became jurors, were asked individually whether they would automatically vote against a death sentence, defense counsel requested the
trial court to ask the venirepersons individually whether they
would automatically vote for a death sentence upon a conviction.69
The court refused, maintaining that it had already substantially
covered the question by asking the venirepersons if they could
serve impartially and if they could follow jury instructions.70 In
fact, each eventual juror had responded affirmatively to those
questions. 71
The jury convicted Morgan and imposed a death sentence.72
Morgan appealed his conviction and sentence directly to the Illiserve as jurors in the case on trial. The court may permit the parties to submit
additional questions to it for further inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate, or
may permit the parties to supplement the examination by such direct inquiry as
the court deems proper.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 234 (1991).
65. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2226.
66. Id. The trial court asked the following question of all those eventually empaneled
on the jury: "Would you automatically vote against the death penalty no matter what the
facts of the case were?" Id. The practice of excluding persons through such questions,
known as "death-qualifying" the jury, is an accepted and almost universal practice in
capital voir dire. JURYWORK, supra note 45, § 23.01[l].
67. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2226.
68. Id.
69. Id. Defense counsel requested the following question: "If you found Derrick
Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what
the facts are?" Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Nine of the jurors responded affirmatively to the question: "Would you follow my instructions on the law, even though you may not agree?" Id. The remaining
three jurors were not asked that particular question. Id. All 12 jurors indicated either
that they could "be fair and impartial" or that they could "give both sides a fair trial."
Id. at 2227.
72. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2226.
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nois Supreme Court, 3 which affirmed the conviction and rejected
Morgan's claim that he had been denied an impartial sentencing
jury owing to the failure of the court to question the jurors about
their pro-death-penalty views.7 4 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on Morgan's appeal of sentence, 75 noting disagreement among the states on whether a capital defendant has the
right to such an inquiry. 6 Finding that the voir dire in Morgan's
case had not adequately assured the impartiality of his sentencing
jury, the Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's affirmance of
73. Id. Appeal of a capital conviction or sentence lies directly with the Illinois
Supreme Court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(i) (1991).
74. People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d 755, 778 (Il1. 1991). The Illinois Supreme Court
claimed that it had previously held that a trial court was not required to ask venirepersons if they would automatically vote for the death penalty. Id. at 778 (citing People v.
Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d 402, 409-10 (111.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985); People v. Caballero, 464 N.E.2d 223, 234 (Ill.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984)). But see infra note 92.
75. 112 S. Ct. 295 (1991). The Court did not review Morgan's conviction and stated
that its decision had no effect on the conviction. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2235 n. 11 (citing
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523 n. 21).
The effect on guilt-determining juries of excluding anti-death-penalty persons, so-called
death qualification, has been explored in cases, commentary, and research. The Witherspoon Court rejected the defendant's claim that his jury:
unlike one chosen at random from a cross-section of the community, must necessarily be biased in favor of conviction, for the kind of juror who would be
unperturbed by the prospect of sending a man to his death ... is the kind of
juror who would too readily ignore the presumption of the defendant's innocence, accept the prosecution's version of the facts, and return a verdict of guilt.
391 U.S. at 516-17. The Court found unconvincing the studies that the defendant produced as evidence that death-qualified juries are more likely to convict. Id. at 517-18.
The Court ruled: "We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the record now
before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital
punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction." Id.
The Court amplified this position in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), in
which it rejected a defendant's argument that the State's exclusions for cause under
Wainwright violated his rights to an impartial guilt-determining jury and a jury selected
from a representative cross-section of the community. Id. at 177, 184. The Court ruled
against the defendant even though it gave some credence to certain studies submitted as
evidence of the greater likelihood of conviction with death-qualified juries. Id. at 168-73.
Lockhart has effectively neutralized capital defendants' longstanding claims that deathqualification is unconstitutional. JURYWORK, supra note 45, §§ 23.01[1], [3]. Both Lockhart and Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980), contain extensive citations
to and critiques of studies on death qualification, as does JURYWORK, supra note 45,
§§ 23.04[2]-[4].
76. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2227. The Court identified three states that agreed with the
Illinois position that questions on pro-death-penalty bias are unnecessary if each juror
swears to be impartial and to follow instructions: Delaware, South Carolina, and Missouri. The Court identified 11 states that disagreed: California, Georgia, Louisiana, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, and Alabama
(based on Alabama lower court decisions). Id. at 2227 n.4.
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Morgan's sentence.77
B.

The Decision of the Supreme Court

In the majority opinion, Justice White resolved several issues in
determining that the trial court had violated Morgan's due process
rights by denying him the requested inquiry. 7s First, the Court reviewed and affirmed the established principle that if a state chooses
to conduct capital sentencing by jury, due process requires that the
jury be impartial.79 On the basis of that principle, the Court held
that a capital defendant may exclude for cause a prospective capital sentencing juror who declares that he or she will automatically
vote for the death penalty upon a conviction.8 0 This conclusion
might appear to have been easily reached-an automatic death
penalty (ADP)8 1 juror would seem to epitomize bias and partiality.
In Wainwright, however, the Court had ruled that bias makes an
individual partial only if it hampers his or her ability to follow
sentencing instructions.8 2 Thus, the Court was compelled to
demonstrate in detail that ADP bias will have that effect.
The Court first posited that the Illinois capital murder statute, 3
consistent with general Eighth Amendment requirements, 84 directs
that at the weighing stage, jurors be instructed to determine
whether mitigating factors are sufficient to preclude the death penalty. 5 The Court reasoned that ADP jurors will surely fail to follow these instructions, however, because by announcing an
intention to vote automatically for the death penalty, they thereby
announce an intention to ignore mitigating evidence-no matter
how strong.8 6 Thus, the Court concluded, under Wainwright per77. Id. at 2235.
78. Id. at 2228. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined
in the majority opinion. Id. at 2225. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined
in the dissenting opinion written by Justice Scalia. Id. at 2235.
79. Id. at 2229.
80. Id. at 2230-31, 2233-35.
81. In this Note, the acronym ADP will be used to refer to persons who would always
vote for the death penalty upon a capital conviction, and NDP will be used to designate
persons who would never vote for the death penalty.
82. 469 U.S. at 424; see also supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
83. The Illinois first degree murder statute itself outlines in detail how capital sentencing juries are to be instructed. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)-(g); see also
supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
84. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2234 (citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 34-35 (1986)
(White, J., plurality opinion)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2234-35.
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sons with ADP views are inherently partial8 7 and subject to exclusion for cause."8 A death sentence imposed by a jury containing
even one ADP juror, the majority held, cannot stand.8 9
The majority opinion focused only on the weighing stage of the
Illinois sentencing process; the Court did not specifically address
the question of a juror who would deliberately "find" a nonexistent
aggravating factor at the eligibility stage. 90 On the whole, Morgan
does not consider the way death penalty bias might'affect a sentencing juror in determining the existence of aggravating factors. 91
The Court next held that upon the defendant's request,'a judge
conducting capital voir dire must directly question prospective ju92
rors on their propensity toward imposing capital punishment.
The Court began by acknowledging that trial judges have histori87. Illinois did not argue to the Morgan Court that ADP jurors could serve impartially on capital sentencing juries. Id. at 2230. The Court addressed the ADP impartiality issue in large part, perhaps, because of the dissent, which contended that ADP jurors
serve impartially. See infra notes 103 -09 and accompanying text. The Court charged
that there was "no support in either the statutory or decisional law of Illinois" for the
proposition that an ADP juror could be impartial. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2234. However, in People v. Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d 402, 409-10 (Ill.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908
(1985), the Illinois Supreme Court suggested that the fact that a juror would "automatically impose the death penalty for all premeditated murders" does not make that juror
subject to exclusion for cause. Thus, Brisbon suggests a position in disagreement with the
Morgan Court.
88. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229-30; see also supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the Wainwright rule).
89. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2230.
90. Justice Scalia remarked in his dissent that Morgan had framed the issues in his
brief so that "the juror who will ignore the requirement of finding an aggravating factor is
not at issue." Id. at 2236 n. 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent also indicated that even
if raised, that issue would be insubstantial because few jurors would "not impartially
make the strictly factual determination, at the first stage of Illinois' two part sentencing
procedure, that the defendant is eligible for the death penalty." Id.
91. This may have left an issue untouched. It is correct that determination of aggravating factors, at least in Illinois, does involve a factual inquiry into whether the defendant engaged in certain conduct as part of the murder. Did he kill for hire? Was the
murder premeditated? See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. This fact-finding
process might constrain even an ADP juror from conjuring an aggravating factor out of
thin air. Still, factual questions are often close. In a close case, an ADP juror's vote on
factual matters affecting the sentence would be assured.
92. Id. at 2228, 2232, 2235. The Court overruled the Illinois Supreme Court, which
had relied on its previous rulings to hold that Morgan was not entitled to an ADP inquiry. See People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d at 778 (citing Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d at 409-10;
Caballero, 464 N.E.2d at 234).
The Illinois court's reliance on Brisbon and Caballero, however, was arguably misplaced, because the questions involved in those cases were not necessarily the same as the
question in Morgan. The Brisbon defendant did not claim that he had been denied an
ADP inquiry. 478 N.E.2d at 409-10. Caballero rejected a defendant's claim that the trial
judge erred in not sua sponte questioning the venirepersons on ADP bias. 464 N.E.2d at
234.
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cally enjoyed wide discretion in controlling the questions asked in
voir dire.9 The Court stressed that this discretion, however, is
"subject to the essential demands of fairness," 94 and that capital
cases involve unique concerns, which justify allowing defendants a
sentencing-bias inquiry. 95 The Court emphasized that without
questions on sentencing bias, capital defendants cannot effectively
exercise their right to exclude ADP persons from their sentencing
juries.9' The Court also noted its decisions supporting state-requested inquiries on sentencing bias; the Court reasoned that defendants should have a complementary right to their own
97
inquiries.

Finally, the Court found that in conducting Morgan's voir dire,
the Illinois trial court had relied on inadequate questions. 98 Those
general questions, the Court maintained, might not have exposed
improper pro-death-penalty bias:99 persons subjected to no more
than general questions might believe and even say that they could
follow instructions yet still harbor unannounced death penalty biases that would prevent them from doing so.100 The Court also
93. Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2230.
94. Id. (citing Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931)).
95. Id. at 2230 (citing Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986); Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2232 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170 n.7 (1986); Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 423). The Lockhart Court rejected a defendant's argument that the
State's exclusion for cause under Wainwright of persons opposing the death penalty violated his rights to an impartial guilt-determining jury and to a jury selected from a crosssection of the community. 476 U.S. at 177, 184.
98. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2233.
99. Id.
100. Id. The Court quoted the following exchange from Wainwright as support for
its proposition:
THE COURT: Wait a minute ma'am. I haven't made up my mind yet. Just
have a seat. Let me ask you these things. Do you have any
prefixed ideas about this case at all?
[A]:
Not at all.
THE COURT: Will you follow the law that I give you?
[A]:
I could do that.
THE COURT: What I am concerned about is that you indicated that you
have a state of mind that might make you unable to follow the
law of this State.
[A]:
I could not bring back a death penalty.
THE COURT: Step down.
Id. at 2233 n.9 (citing Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 432 n.12).
One author noted a similarly remarkable exchange involving a prospective juror's
preconceived notions of a defendant's guilt:
[D]uring the questioning of prospective jurors for the 1971 murder trial of
Black Panthers Bobby Seale and Ericka Higgins... defense attorney Catherine
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noted that in People v. Jackson 101 the Illinois Supreme Court itself
had commented that although it did not require trial judges to provide direct questioning on pro-death-penalty bias, such questioning
is not inappropriate and is the best way to expose bias. 102
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

Although the State did not argue that an ADP juror could be
impartial,10 3 Justice Scalia did. His dissenting opinion squarely
contradicted the majority by arguing that ADP jurors can follow
instructions as Wainwright requires, and thus can serve impartially
on capital sentencing juries.10 4
Justice Scalia first noted that the Illinois murder statute requires
jurors to determine whether mitigating evidence is "sufficient" to
outweigh aggravating factors and thus preclude a death sentence.10 5 Justice Scalia reasoned that this requirement does not
prohibit a juror from taking the "bright line position" that no mitigating evidence is ever sufficient to outweigh an aggravating factor. 10 6 Such a juror, he concluded, can properly apply Illinois
Roraback asked a juror who had said repeatedly that she could be fair, "Is there
anything about your attitude or experiences we haven't covered in all these
questions that would make you unable to listen to the evidence in this case and
reach an unbiased verdict?" The prospective juror looked directly at the defendant for the first time and burst out, "She's guilty!"... The judge promptly
excused her for cause.
JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES:

OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT

TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 141 (1977).

101. 582 N.E.2d 125 (Ill. 1991), vacated, Jackson v. Illinois, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992).
102. Id. In deciding Jackson, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on its Morgan ruling
to uphold a denial of a capital defendant's request for an ADP inquiry. Jackson, 582
N.E.2d at 156. The U.S. Supreme Court has since vacated that judgment in accordance
with its ruling in Morgan. Jackson v. Illinois, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992). In Jackson, despite
its holding, the Illinois Supreme Court recommended that capital defendants be allowed a
sentencing bias inquiry: "[G]iven the type of scrutiny capital cases receive on review, one
would think trial courts would go out of their way to afford a defendant every possible
safeguard." 582 N.E.2d at 156.
103. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2230.
104. Id. at 2236-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas joined in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 2235.
105. Id. at 2237 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The statute directs:
If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that one or more [aggravating factors] exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the court and shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be
imposed. If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall

sentence the defendant to death.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(g) (1991).
106. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

instructions. 107
Justice Scalia further maintained that neither due process nor
the Eighth Amendment requires capital jurors to actually give
weight to mitigating evidence when choosing a sentence." °8 He
concluded, in essence, that although capital defendants have an
Eighth Amendment right to present mitigating evidence at sentencing, they do not have a right to sentencing jurors who will listen to it. He maintained that though a juror who ignores
mitigating evidence might be "merciless," that juror could nonetheless follow instructions and therefore would not also be
"lawless." 109
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that even if it were conceded that
ADP individuals are partial, due process does not require trial
judges to honor requests for specific questions aimed at identifying
them. 0 Justice Scalia charged that as a rule, defendants are entitled to a specific voir dire inquiry only if a "special circumstance,"
like an interracial capital crime, would make refusal to conduct a
specific inquiry fundamentally unfair."' Justice Scalia maintained
that no circumstance warrants allowing all capital defendants a
pro-death-penalty inquiry.11 2 Rather, Justice Scalia opined, general questioning on each venireperson's ability to follow instructions is sufficient, since it is that ability which determines
impartiality. 11 3
Justice Scalia acknowledged that Morgan's trial judge conducted
an anti-death-penalty (NDP)" 4 inquiry at the prosecutor's request."' He argued, however, that this did not entitle Morgan to
complementary questioning as a matter of fairness. This was so,
Justice Scalia reasoned, because it takes only one anti-death-pen107. Id. at 2241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reasoned:
[T]he juror who says he will always vote for the death penalty is not promising
to be lawless, since there is no case in which he is by law compelled to find a
mitigating fact "sufficiently mitigating." The people of Illinois have decided, in
other words, that murder with certain aggravators will be punished by death,
unless the jury chooses to extend mercy. That scheme complies with our (everexpanding) death-penalty jurisprudence as it existed yesterday. The Court has,
in effect, now added the new rule that no merciless jurors can sit.
Id.
108. Id. at 2236, 2238 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2239-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2240 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. See supra note 81.
115. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2240-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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alty juror to block a death sentence, while eleven pro-death-penalty
16
jurors cannot impose one."

IV.

ANALYSIS

Witherspoon, as it was widely interpreted, provided a straightforward and strict standard for excluding prospective capital sentencing jurors who oppose the death penalty. Wainwright set forth
a less stringent standard, which, as the Morgan opinions 4how,
proved difficult to interpret and implement. Leaving a gap in the
law, the Court's decisions prior to Morgan did not rule on the right
of capital defendants to identify and exclude pro-death-penalty
jurors.
Through Morgan, the Court has now established sound rules for
both states and defendants. Morgan implements fundamental fairness by sensibly characterizing biased capital sentencing jurors.
Morgan also reflects the recognition by the Court that judicial autonomy is not an end in itself but rather that it must be balanced
against and sometimes subordinated to individual rights. The two
major thrusts of Morgan, recognizing capital defendants' rights to
specific voir dire inquiries and characterizing biased capital sentencing jurors, are analyzed below.
A. Right to a Specific Inquiry
In deciding whether a defendant has the right to a specific ADP
inquiry, the Court encountered the basic tension between preserving judicial autonomy while at the same time providing fairness to
criminal defendants. It responded by extending to capital defendants the rare right to a specific voir dire inquiry."I7 In doing so, the
Court advanced due process rights without unduly sacrificing judicial discretion.
Morgan is a significant departure from past rulings because the
Court did not make potential racial or ethnic prejudice in the ve116. Id. at 2241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Proposing that ADP and NDP jurors will
have unequal influence on a sentencing jury, Justice Scalia remarked:
I reject petitioner's argument that it is "fundamentally unfair" to allow Illinois
to make specific inquiries concerning those jurors who will always vote against
the death penalty but to preclude the defendant from discovering (and excluding) those jurors who will always vote in favor of death. . . . [T]here is no
unfairness in the asymmetry. By reason of Illinois' death-penalty unanimity
requirement ... the practical consequences of allowing the two types of jurors
to serve are vastly different: A single death-penalty opponent can block that
punishment, but 11 unwavering advocates cannot impose it.
Id. (citations omitted).
117. See id. at 2233, 2235.
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nire a condition of this specific voir dire inquiry.11 8 Rather, the
Morgan Court made its allowance for capital defendants solely because they are capital defendants. Thus, the Morgan decision may
inspire less meritorious voir dire claims that similarly do not turn
on potential racial or ethnic prejudice. Also, by adding incrementally to the due process rights of capital defendants, the Morgan decision arguably further complicates capital punishment
jurisprudence. 119
Nonetheless, fundamentally fair treatment of capital defendants
can hardly be achieved unless they are equipped with effective
means to detect those jurors who will not be impartial in determining a sentence. Questioning venirepersons about their basic capacity for fairness cannot accomplish this.'2 Only questioning them
directly about their sentencing biases can safeguard jury integrity
in the way that due process demands.
Clearly, the convicted capital defendant has a paramount due
process concern: that the jury which chooses a punishment of
either incarceration or execution will do so in an impartial manner.12 1 In selecting that jury, judicial autonomy should be
118. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
119. Justice Scalia charged:
Today, obscured within the fog of confusion that is our annually improvised
Eighth-Amendment "death-is-different" jurisprudence, the Court strikes a further blow against the People in its campaign against the death penalty. Not
only must mercy be allowed, but now only the merciful may be permitted to sit
in judgment.
Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia's Morgan dissent has been cited as an example of the "[t]ensions on the
Supreme Court, arising from strongly held and widely divergent philosophies, [which]
increasingly find reflection in intemperate language in the Justices' opinions." Arnold C.
Johnson, Supreme Court Sound and Fury, LEGAL TIMES, December 14, 1992, at 30.
120. The majority of the states that have considered the issue support this view. See
supra note 76; e.g., People v. Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659, 679 (Cal. 1989), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 931 (1990) ("In order to intelligently exercise the right to challenge for cause defendant's counsel must be accorded reasonable opportunity to lay a foundation for the
challenge by questioning prospective jurors on voir dire to learn whether any entertain"
ADP views.) (quoting People v. Hughes, 367 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1961)); State v. Williams,
550 A.2d 1172, 1184 (N.J. 1988) ("[T]he failure to inquire into [ADP views] denied counsel and the trial court the tools with which to insure that the jury panel could fairly
undertake its role ....").
121. The Court has announced before that capital cases raise particularly serious due
process concerns. See Lankford v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 1732 (1991) (emphasizing the
"special importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing context"); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (basing entitlement to a voir dire inquiry in part on the
severity of capital punishment); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998 (1983) (stating
"[tihe qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination"); Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 988 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[w]here a life
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subordinated to the capital defendant's unique due process concerns in order to properly safeguard the defendant's interest in
life. 22 Capital defendants deserve access to the inquiry that Derrick Morgan was denied. Furthermore, providing that access will
help maintain an image of basic fairness in our criminal justice
system. 123
B.

Juror Impartiality

Morgan establishes three points regarding impartiality. First, it
holds that ADP jurors are partial and may be excluded for
cause. 124 Second, it supports the already established practice of excluding NDP persons. 125 In making these first two points, the
Court has acknowledged that capital jurors who decide a sentence
is at stake, the risk that a particular defendant has been selected [for a death sentence] for
the wrong reason is unacceptable and incompatible with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (noting that the "qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a
greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed").
122. The subordination of judicial autonomy is minor: "The risk that [ADP] jurors
may have been empaneled in this case and 'infected petitioner's capital sentencing is unacceptable in light of the ease with which that risk could have been minimized.'" Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2233 (quoting Turner, 476 U.S. at 36). The Court noted in RosalesLopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981), that the burden placed on a trial court
by requiring it to ask racial bias questions would "likely .. .be slight." The Mu'Min
dissent rejected "the majority's claim that content questioning ...would unduly burden
trial courts," noting that "[n]umerous Federal Circuits and States" had concluded that
content questions would not "compromis[e] judicial efficiency." Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111
S. Ct. 1899, 1916-17 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Mu'Min, see
supra note 27.
123. The Court has spoken to this concern in countering a proposal that defendants
not be allowed an inquiry on racial bias:
We think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that
persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors
and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred. No
surer way could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191 (quoting Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314-315).
124. Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2229-30. This point may not be a "holding" in the purest
sense. To illustrate, the Court phrased the core issue before it as "whether, during voir
dire for a capital offense, a state trial court may, consistent with the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, refuse inquiry into whether a potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of the defendant." Id. at 2225.
Before reaching its holding on that overarching question, the Court found it necessary to
resolve whether an ADP sentencing juror is partial. Id. at 2230; see also supra note 87.
It was perhaps necessary to answer that question only because Justice Scalia raised it. See
supra note 87. This makes the Court's point on the partiality of ADP jurors an unusual
component of its holding.
125. Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2229, 2233. Since Morgan ruled specifically on the impartiality of ADP jurors, any statement it made on the impartiality of NDP jurors can be
characterized as dicta. However, six Justices agreed that NDP jurors are undeniably
partial. See id. at 2229. The Court also stated that along with ADP jurors, NDP jurors

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

before trial cannot reasonably follow sentencing instructions and
are therefore partial under Wainwright. Finally, Morgan makes
Wainwright's general "follow the instructions" standard applicable
to both states and defendants. 126 Under that standard, venirepersons with less than absolute death penalty beliefs can be assessed
for their ability to follow capital sentencing instructions
1

properly.

27

All told, neither side enjoys an advantage over the other. Nonetheless, states might argue, as Illinois did in Morgan, that because
it may take several unanimous jury findings in order to impose a
death sentence, 128 states cannot adequately advance their interest
in capital punishment unless they are allowed an advantage in seating death penalty proponents. 129 Capital defendants might counter
that the severity and irrevocability of capital punishment entitles
them to their own advantage in excluding such persons. Nevertheless, it is most judicious to provide both parties with equal means
to pursue their interest in seating a favorable sentencing jury. If
the legislature and the people choose to punish certain offenders
"by definition are ones who cannot perform their duties in accordance with [the] law."
Id. at 2233.
These propositions of course echo the once popular interpretation of the now much
discounted Witherspoon footnote 21. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
However, as of Morgan the Court still maintains: "At its inception, Witherspoon conferred no 'right' on a State, but was in reality a limitation of a State's making unlimited
challenges for cause to exclude those jurors who 'might hesitate' to return a verdict imposing death." Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2231 (citing Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512-13).
The Court's approach suggests that though it agrees with the assertion in the footnote
that those who would never impose a death sentence are partial, it is concerned about
lending too much authority to the footnote and thus raising again the widespread interpretation of it as a limit on exclusion grounds.
Regardless of any vagaries in the Court's opinions, probing for and excluding death
penalty opponents remains an almost universal practice in capital voir dire. JURYWORK,
supra note 45, § 23.03.
126. See Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. The Court applied Wainwright to determine
that "[a] juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her
instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause." Id. The Court
also stated that "a juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case
will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do." Id. What follows necessarily from these
points is that Wainwright must serve as the test whenever a prospective sentencing juror's
impartiality is challenged on the grounds of death penalty beliefs-whether those beliefs
are pro or con, absolute or less pronounced.
127. See JURYWORK, supra note 45, § 23.03[1][a] (noting that the broad Wainwright
standard can be applied to exclude venirepersons with less than absolute death penalty
beliefs).
128. In Illinois, for example, the jury must unanimously convict the defendant, find
an aggravating factor, and agree that mitigating circumstances do not rule out a death
sentence. See supra notes 55-61.
129. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2232 n.8.
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with death, that punishment should be imposed in a forum in
which neither party has a procedural advantage over the other.
Indeed, Justice Scalia's position that ADP jurors can be impartial is not entirely untenable. He argued persuasively that the Illinois murder statute and prior Court decisions require only that
capital sentencing jurors
hear mitigating evidence, not that they
30
also be amenable to it.1
Regarding the Illinois statute, Justice Scalia's difference with the
Court turned on his determination that the word sufficient would
accommodate the absolutist juror who believes that no mitigating
factor should ever preclude a death sentence for a murder with an
aggravating factor. 131 There is nothing that directly supports or
refutes this position in the text of the statute. In fact, the Illinois
Supreme Court suggested in People v. Brisbon that it would follow
Justice Scalia's view.1 32 Additionally, the Free v. Peters court,
which recently vacated an Illinois death sentence on constitutional
grounds, 33 wrestled with the ambiguity of the word sufficient in
the context of the statute.13 1 In view of all of this, Justice Scalia's
argument looks at least creative if not correct.
To support his assessment of Eighth Amendment requirements,
Justice Scalia offered a restrictive interpretation of key phrases
from numerous Court rulings. By his narrow reading, in each case
the Court went no further than to affirm the capital defendant's
bare right to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. That
interpretation, while conveniently literal, is not outright unreasonable. 135
130. Id. at 2236-38.
131. Id.
132. 478 N.E.2d 402 (Ill.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985); see also supra note 87.
133. 806 F. Supp. 705, 731-32 (N.D. Ill. 1992), vacated, No. 89 C 3765 (N.D. Ill.
April 15, 1993). The Free court vacated its ruling because of a de facto reversal by the
Seventh Circuit. See supra note 61.
134. Free, 806 F. Supp. at 728-31.
135. To demonstrate that the Court's death penalty cases allow for the "merciless"
juror, Justice Scalia supplied an extensive string cite of those cases. He quoted phrases
stating variously that: "[the Eighth Amendment is satisfied] by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence"; "the State cannot bar relevant mitigating evidence"; "[jurors must] be permitted to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence";
"[states may not] prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to [mitigating
evidence]"; "[the sentencer] must be free to weigh relevant mitigating evidence." Morgan, 112 S.Ct. at 2238 (citations omitted). Reading these phrases as Justice Scalia did
does not necessarily contradict their plain meaning. Nor does a plain reading necessarily
support the meaning the Court would give them.
The power of Justice Scalia's argument may also come from the nature of his writing:
"From a dramatic standpoint, too, Scalia stands out. Of the three justices who regularly
write their own opinions (David Souter and John Paul Stevens are the other two), only
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In summary, though Justice Scalia's semantics may raise eyebrows in the context of this case, his conclusions are not patently
erroneous. The Court could have taken his view without abandoning, at least technically, supportable reasoning or express precedent. The Court instead ruled reasonably and fairly.
V.

IMPACT

The Morgan decision affects capital offense voir dire in Illinois
and in all other states that have denied or would deny defendants
the right to a voir dire inquiry on death penalty views. Defendants
will no longer have to rely on general questioning by trial judges to
expose persons whose biases render them unqualified to sit on capital sentencing juries. Also, prisoners currently on death row may
1 36
have a new avenue for appeal.
Morgan, however, may leave room for interpretation regarding
exactly what inquiry it prescribes. The most obvious reading of
Morgan limits defendants to a very specific inquiry, perhaps just
one question: "Will you automatically vote for a death sen'
tence?" 137
That reading, however, departs from the Court's past
rulings, which required judges to cover only a certain subject
rather than to ask precisely scripted questions.1 38 Consistent with
those past rulings, Morgan could be interpreted as requiring some
inquiry on sentencing bias, with the particulars still shaped by the
trial judge. 139 In the future, counsel and the courts may have to
Scalia writes with flair." Jeffrey Rosen, The Leader of the Opposition, THE NEW REPUBLIC, January 18, 1993, at 20.
136. In People v. Jackson, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on its Morgan ruling to
uphold a denial of a capital defendant's request for an ADP inquiry. 582 N.E.2d 125,
156 (Ill. 1991). The Court has since vacated that judgment in accordance with its ruling
in Morgan. Jackson v. Illinois, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992).
137. Supporting the possibility that the Court meant to mandate only the specific
ADP question, the Court defined the issue before it narrowly. See Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at
2225; see also supra note 124. The Court ruled that "the defendant in this case was
entitled to have the inquiry made that he proposed to the trial judge." Id. at 2235. That
precise inquiry was: "If you found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote
to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are?" Id. at 2226. The Court also
stated that its ruling dealt with the need for a voir dire to "lay bare the foundation of
petitioner's challenge for cause against those prospective jurors who would always impose
death following conviction." Id. at 2232. Taking the Court at its word suggests that it
intends defendants to have an ADP-specific inquiry only.
Moreover, the Court's holding focuses on ADP bias; it does not address the question of
how less pronounced forms of sentencing bias might result in partiality. See Morgan, 112
S. Ct. at 2229-30, 2233-35. Perhaps, then, the Court meant to limit the questions it mandated to ones (or one) on the very specific topic it addressed.
138. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
139. From the defendant's tactical viewpoint, either direct ADP questions or more
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resolve this uncertainty.
The impact of Morgan will depend in large part on the number
of ADPs in the jury pool. Estimates are disparate.'" Adding to
the uncertainty is the possibility that what persons report to researchers may not accurately conform with
their behavior when
1 41
offender.
capital
a
sentence
they actually
Morgan should also promote the effective use of peremptory
challenges by capital defendants. A response to Morgan-authorized questioning that does not justify exclusion for cause may still
provide reason to exercise a peremptory challenge. 142 Without a
general inquiries would have advantages and disadvantages. A pointed ADP question
should of course succeed in revealing ADP bias. It is less likely, though not inconceivable, that such a question would also expose less extreme bias that would still justify an
exclusion for cause or give reason to exercise a peremptory challenge. JURYWORK, supra
note 45, § 23.02[l].
If the judge must cover only the subject of death penalty bias, the judge may, if he or
she wishes, avoid asking the specific ADP question. Then the most vehement and potentially harmful bias, ADP bias, might not be exposed. See id. § 23.03[l][a] n.23 (noting
that ADP persons are reluctant to reveal their views). However, other biases might be
detected.
All this illustrates an inherent dilemma in prescribing voir dire inquiries. The Court
hesitates to undertake scripting inquiries in detail, and perhaps rightfully so. See
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1904, 1906 (1991) (noting that "voir dire is not
easily subject to appellate review," and that "primary reliance on the judgment of the
trial court makes good sense"). But when the Court instead directs the trial judge to
cover only a certain subject, the judge is left with leeway to manipulate the questions
within that subject in order to circumvent the Court's practical intent. See id. at 1909
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that not requiring judges to ask specified questions on
pretrial publicity "turns ... the Sixth Amendment's right to an impartial jury-into a
hollow formality").
140. See, e.g., Michael T. Nietzel et al., Effects of Voir Dire Variations in Capital
Trials: A Replication and Extension, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 467, 473 (1987) (stating that of
242 prospective capital jurors removed for cause in 18 trials, 25.8% were removed because they were ADP); Michael L. Neises & Ronald C. Dillehay, Death Qualification and
Conviction Proneness: Witt and Witherspoon Compared, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 479, 485
(1987) (noting that a survey of 135 registered voters in Kentucky showed 24.1% to be
ADPs); Joseph Kadane, After Hovey. A Note on Taking Account of the Automatic Death
Penalty Juror, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 115, 116 (1984) (finding that 1% of the national
adult population claimed they would be fair and impartial in deciding guilt or innocence
in a capital case but would always vote for the death penalty); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F.
Supp. 1273, 1296-97 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (stating that 2% of respondents in a nonrandom
survey were ADP) (citing George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death-Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971)).

141.

See

WELSH S. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE:

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN

CAPITAL CASES 101 (1984) (stating that "[e]ven the most well-designed social science
experiment will only provide, at best, circumstantial evidence of the truth of the proposition it seeks to prove"); Kenneth C. Haas & James Inciardi, Lingering Doubts About a
Popular Punishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 45, at 11
(noting that "people's willingness to endorse capital punishment in the abstract is not
necessarily an accurate measure of their willingness to put it into practice").
142. See People v. Howard, 588 N.E.2d 1044, 1057-58 (Ill. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 24

Morgan inquiry, a sentencing bias might not be exposed at all.
The Morgan decision should be interpreted as clearly and comprehensively delineating the proper grounds for challenges for
cause based on capital sentencing biases. The difficulty the Court
has had in setting and promulgating an impartiality standard,143
however, indicates that Morgan may not be the final word on this
subject.
Morgan may stir more determined state legislatures to revise
their capital sentencing laws to the advantage of prosecutors seeking the death penalty."4' States may also choose to delegate capital
sentencing to trial judges, many of whom must please a public that
largely supports the death penalty 45 in order to secure elected
posts. 146

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Morgan Court recognized that capital defendants need special safeguards to ensure the integrity of sentencing juries. The
Court also made clear that the Constitution will not allow capital
sentencing to be entrusted to jurors who would determine a sentence before the trial begins. The Court has thus extended to capital defendants what fundamental fairness requires. Death penalty
Ct. 215 (1992) (approving a prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a venireperson whose
anti-death-penalty views were not strong enough to justify exclusion for cause under
Wainwright); see also supra note 139.
143. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
144. A LEXIS search performed on March 18, 1993 revealed the following legislative
proposals to add aggravating factors to death penalty laws: Illinois (murder committed
with a machine gun, sawed-off shotgun or rifle, semi-automatic shotgun or rifle, molotov
cocktail, bomb, or grenade); Florida (victim was a minor in defendant's care); Maryland
(witness murder, murder related to a drug offense, murder committed during a carjacking); New Jersey (murder connected with drug trafficking); South Carolina (murder committed during a carjacking). These are presented not to suggest a direct correlation with
Morgan but rather to show the steps that can be taken by states to widen the application
of the death penalty.
145. See supra note 32.
146. Since the Constitution does not require states to conduct capital sentencing by
jury, revising statutes or delegating capital sentencing to judges would not necessarily be
prohibited. See supra note 11. Indeed, in a footnote to his Witherspoon dissent, Justice
White announced: "The States should be aware of the ease with which they can adjust to
today's decision ... replacing the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts with majority
decisions about sentence should achieve roughly the same result reached by the Illinois
legislature through the procedure struck down today." 391 U.S. at 542 n.2.
In Morgan, Justice Scalia charged that "the wholesale elimination of jurors favoring
the death penalty ... will be the consequence of today's decision." 112 S. Ct. at 2241.
While it may prove to be an overstatement, Justice Scalia's charge demonstrates the fervor with which death penalty proponents can react to cases like Morgan.
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opponents and advocates alike should view the Morgan decision as
balancing the scales of justice.
THOMAS

J. EME

